Introduction
Since the early 2000s governments', regulators' and researchers' attention to corporate governance has increased significantly. Such interest has largely been directed towards the monitoring of overall corporate governance structures, financial controls and financial performance. This research focuses on the first aspects, i.e. corporate monitoring process and the relationships between those monitoring roles using structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM is a technique for analysing data designed to assess relationships among both manifest (i.e. directly measured or observed) and latent (i.e. the underlying theoretical construct) variables (Martens, 2005) . When using statistical techniques such as multiple regression or ANOVA, the researcher only conducts the analysis on variables that are directly measurable, which can be somewhat limiting when the individual is interested in testing alternate governance mechanisms and include a list of the control variables in their analysis. Using various measures of financial performance as a proxy for shareholders' interests, this research examines whether selected monitoring mechanisms -the board and its committees, shareholders, and independent auditors -affect the business performance of Australia's Top 500 listed companies pre and post global financial crisis (GFC), and the extent to which these mechanisms function as substitutes or complement each other.
The possibility of substitution among various monitoring mechanisms has been previously examined (e.g. Ward et al., 2009; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Fernández and Arrondo, 2005; Coles et al., 2001) . Ward et al. (2009) propose that when companies are operating poorly, outside monitoring by institutional investors can complement internal monitoring, which is usually done by boards of directors. Boo and Sharma (2008) examine the relationship between internal governance, external audit monitoring and regulatory oversight. They conclude that regulatory oversight reduces information asymmetry; hence, reducing the demand for costly monitoring by the external auditor. Fernández and Arrondo (2005) find in their investigation of Spanish companies that when the number of external directors increases, the number of insider shareholding decreases and vice versa. Coles et al. (2001) argue that companies may substitute governance choices in selecting the monitoring mechanisms most suitable for their organisational and environmental contexts. However, a major limitation of these studies concerned the lack of controlling for endogeneity which exists in most corporate governance research. Indeed, failing to fully control for all forms of endogeneity can lead to spurious results (Schultz et al., 2010) .
Companies' performance depends on how efficient a mix of monitoring mechanisms is in controlling the agency problem (Ward et al., 2009; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) . This research aims to provide insights into how the bundle of monitoring mechanisms works to reduce the agency problem. Even though the overall bundle is effective in aligning managers and shareholder interests, the impact of any one mechanism may compromise the achievement of such an alignment (Ward et al., 2009) . This issue will be explored by looking at multivariate relationships of certain monitoring mechanisms and performance consequences.
Statistical tools that are commonly used to examine the relationship between monitoring and performance, for example multiple regressions, factor analysis, multivariate analysis of variance, etc. can only examine a single relationship at one time. Although multivariate analysis of variance and canonical analysis allow for multiple independent variables, they still only represent a single relationship between the dependent and independent variables. To overcome the problem of inter-relationship this research used SEM. SEM estimates a series of separate but interdependent, multiple regression equations simultaneously by specifying the structural model. The same structural model can express relationships among independent and dependent variables, even when dependent variables become independent variables in other relationships.
There are two major advantages of using SEM over other statistical tools: firstly, it provides a straightforward method for dealing with multiple relationships simultaneously while providing statistical efficiency; and secondly, it has the ability to analyse the relationship comprehensively and provide a transition from exploratory to confirmatory analysis. In research on corporate monitoring there are some variables that are not possible to observe directly. These variables are termed latent variables in SEM. In this research examples of latent variables are monitoring as undertaken by board of directors, shareholders and auditors. As these variables are not observed directly, these need to be related to the observed variables to determine their value. In SEM, it is possible to include both observed and latent variables. Observed variables have data and are usually continuous. A latent variable is a hypothesised and unobserved concept that can only be approximated by observable or measurable variables. Latent variables are expressed in terms of observed variables. The latent variables in SEM are continuous regardless of the properties of the observed variables.
Regulatory responses in Australia such as Australian Securities and Exchange Corporate Governance (ASX CG) and CLERP 9 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) have not addressed the substitute and complementary governance issues. While companies operate in an increasingly globalised economy and very competitive environment, they are also subject to regional and local societal, regulatory and business contexts which may give rise to differences in corporate governance structures and practices. This Australian study offers potentially unique contextualised insights that nonetheless offer lessons for corporate governance and performance monitoring nationally and internationally. This paper is structured as follows: section 2 develops a conceptual view of monitoring mechanisms and performance using an agency perspective; section 3 discusses our research propositions and methodology; section 4 describes sample selection and descriptive statistics for the research; section 5 provides the analysis; and section 6 encapsulates concluding comments and highlights possible avenues for future research.
Theoretical basis for model specification and causality
Theory is important for all multivariate analysis but it is particularly important for SEM because it is considered a confirmatory analysis; that is, it is useful for testing and potentially confirming theory. Theory is needed to specify relationships in the structural models. The SEM process begins by choosing the variables that will be measured. It concludes with assessing the overall structural model fit. In the whole process theory plays a key role at each step. The goal of SEM is to test the theory because without theory, a true SEM test cannot be conducted.
Drawing substantially on agency theory literature and previous empirical research results, this research maps how primary monitoring mechanisms may interrelate and affect company performance. A conceptual model has been constructed for this study in order to provide an integrated understanding of how the monitoring mechanism affects company performance. The scope of monitoring research is depicted in Figure 1 in which this study focuses on three major monitoring mechanisms.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Agency risk will decrease if and when managers can be induced to act in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Denis (2001) finds that there are three devices that encourage management to act in this way: contractually bonding management, providing contractual incentives, and monitoring management activities. Monitoring, however, is a necessary condition for using the first two devices. First, contractually bonding management requires canvassing the possible eventualities and actions that a manager should take. This is not impossible but requires a high level of predictability and efficient monitoring. Second, incentive contracts require monitoring to evaluate the agent's performance and provide incentives accordingly (Denis, 2001) . Thus, an effective monitoring mechanism is required for all situations to induce management to work in the interests of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
There are different kinds of available monitoring mechanisms (internal and external) that can be classified into three broad groupings: market, internal monitoring and regulatory. Market mechanisms may involve block shareholders, the capital market and the managerial labour market. In a single country study, the capital market and managerial labour market are common to all companies and there is a little scope to differentiate among these general market monitoring mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Denis and McConnel, 2003) . Generally, the reputation of individuals in the labour market is a concern to management. In terms of the managerial labour market, if the performance of the company, in which the managers are serving, is not satisfactory it will be difficult for managers to sell themselves in the competitive market. As an internal monitoring mechanism, this study concentrates on insider shareholders and board of directors. Another important internal monitoring mechanism is managerial compensation. However, it is difficult to collect the breakdown of managerial compensation for all the companies. Regarding regulatory mechanisms, Jensen (1993) acknowledges that the legal system is a corporate governance mechanism but characterises it as being 'too blunt an instrument' to deal with the agency problems between managers and shareholders. Furthermore the legal system is common to all companies in a single country study. This study therefore focuses its attention on the external auditors as a monitoring instrument who operates in the form of a regulatory mechanism.
As shown in Figure 1 , the main focus of this paper is on the shareholders, board of directors, and auditors as monitoring mechanisms and the impact they have on company performance. The following review of relevant studies provides the informing structure for this study:
Monitoring by shareholders
Monitoring by the shareholders is classified into two groups: firstly, monitoring by the insiders (executive and non-executive directors); and secondly, by the major outside shareholders (block share holders). The role of director ownership as a monitoring mechanism has been the subject of much empirical analysis (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991) . When board members have considerable holdings in a company's shares, their decisions have an impact on their own wealth. The degree of ownership concentration in a company determines the distribution of power between its managers and shareholders (Welch, 2003) . When ownership is dispersed, shareholders' control tends to be weak; when ownership is concentrated, major shareholders can play an important role in monitoring management and reducing the scope of managerial opportunism (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986) .
Monitoring by the board of directors
For this study, the theoretical role of the board in monitoring and disciplining management is firmly grounded in the agency framework of Fama and Jensen (1983) . Empirical examination of board characteristics and company performance focuses on the following criteria:
Board size Researchers have emphasized the influence of board size on company performance (Jensen, 1993) . Larger boards are less effective monitors due to potential free riding, communication breakdowns and inefficiencies (Bushman et al., 2004; Boo and Sharma, 2008) . Although the direction of influence is unclear (Kent and Stewart, 2008) , most studies find a positive relationship between size of the board and both company performance (Chiang, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) and board monitoring (Anderson et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2005) . Kiel and Nicholson (2003) suggest that there is an inverted U relationship between board size and company performance in which adding directors can bring the board a high level and mix of optimal skills and experience. Beyond that point the difficult dynamics of a large board prevail over the skills and expertise that additional directors might bring.
Independent directors
From an agency perspective, the ability of the board to act as an effective monitoring mechanism is dependent on its independence from management (Beasley, 1996) . Researchers have focused on the proportion of executive to independent directors 1 as an indicator of board independence (Davidson et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2007; Peasnell et al., 2005) . Some previous studies have suggested that independent directors are effective monitors because they do not have financial interests in the company or psychological ties to management (Boo and Sharma, 2008) . Therefore, they are in a better position to objectively challenge management (Klein, 2002; Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004) . Bedard and Johnstone (2004) have also argued that higher independent director representation on the board provides more vigilant oversight of the monitoring process.
Separate role of CEO and chairman With respect to board leadership, a conflict of interest may exist where the roles of CEO and chairman (chair) of the board are held by the same person. When a single individual wears both 'hats', managerial dominance is enhanced since there is greater alignment with management rather than shareholders. It is argued that where the two roles are combined in one person, it is more likely that the CEO will be able to control the board, reduce the board's independence from management, and make decisions in their own interest, at the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1993) . Corporate governance guidelines assume a concentration of power when the CEO is also the chairperson of the board (Cadbury, 1992; Standards Australia International, 2003; ASX CGC 2007) . In Australia, unlike the US, executive chairs are often not the CEO (e.g. Macquarie Bank). Duality measured as the combined role of Chair/CEO captures a subset of the 'non-independent chair' that the concept is essentially about.
Financial expertise of directors According to the Blue Ribbon Committee Report (1999), a well-balanced and effective board should have directors with an array of talent, experience, and expertise which influence different aspects of the company's activities; such diverse contributions are often made by different directors. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) and Cohen et al. (2002) conclude that it is important for committee members to have accounting and financial expertise. Similarly, Ramsay (2001) notes that financial literacy is 'an important component of the general standards of care, skill and diligence required of company directors' (p.155). The directors' financial literacy helps them to understand the implications of basic financial decisions. Financial literacy can be acquired through both formal and self-guided education (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; ASX CGC, 2007; Livingston, 2002) .The general implication is that financial literacy assists directors in monitoring management.
Board diligence
The number of board meetings per year influences the monitoring ability of the board. Too many or too few meetings can be a threat to effective board monitoring. Too few meetings may indicate the directors are not paying proper attention to the company, and too many may indicate that there is some difficulty in the firm (Kang et al., 2007; Vafeas, 1999) . Boards that meet frequently are more likely to perform their duties diligently and effectively, thereby enhancing their level of oversight (Yatim et al., 2006) . Boards of directors need to be active in ensuring high-quality transparent reporting in annual reports (Kent and Stewart, 2008) .
Committees of the board Board committees improve the efficiency of board monitoring by inducing a closer scrutiny of management activities and decision-making. This is particularly true when the board size is large (Menon and Williams, 1994) . ASX CGC (2007) recommends establishing three different committees of the board: audit, nomination and remuneration committee.
Audit committee: A board audit committee focuses on issues relevant to the integrity of the company's financial reporting (Chen and Zhou, 2007; ASX CGC, 2007; Davidson et al., 2005) . Audit committees have received considerable attention following both more distant and more recent corporate scandals (Sarens et al., 2009 ). Prior research finds that an audit committee that meets frequently can reduce the incidence of financial reporting problems (Hughes, 1999; Farber, 2005) . Similar to the full board, the effectiveness of audit committee monitoring depends on: (i) number of meetings (Farber, 2005) , (ii) independence of the board (ASX CGC, 2007) , and (iii) financial literacy of the directors (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) . Although the ASX CGC recommends that all listed companies should have an audit committee, listing rules mandate that only those companies in the Standard & Poor's (S & P) All Ordinaries Index (the top 500 companies by market capitalization) must have a audit committee.
Remuneration committee: A board remuneration committee is an efficient mechanism for focusing the company on appropriate remuneration policies for senior executives. Monitoring ability of the remuneration committee is marked by: (i) number of meetings and (ii) proportion of independent directors on the committee (Bosch, 1995) .
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Nomination committee: The monitoring ability of the nomination committee depends on their independence and frequency of meetings (Leblanc, 2004) . The monitoring ability of the nomination committee can be determined by: (i) number of meetings and (ii) proportion of independent directors on the committee.
Monitoring by external auditors
The auditor's role includes suggesting improvements in internal controls (ASA 265) and going concern issues (ASA 570, 705, 706, CPA Australia, 2011) but nothing directly on company performance. Any association with performance is likely to be a result of the correlation of audit quality. Publicly traded companies in Australia are required to have audits as stipulated in the Corporations Act 2001. However, the quality of audits and subsequent ability to reduce agency costs varies significantly (DeAngelo, 1981) . DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the joint probability that an auditor will: (i) detect a material misstatement in the financial report if one exists (auditor competence); and (ii) report the misstatement if it is detected (auditor independence). Lack of auditor independence will reduce audit quality through a reluctance of the auditor to report any detected misstatements. Therefore, with respect to auditor monitoring, the general finding is that high levels of competence and independence are compulsory for a high quality audit.
Empirical studies from Kim et al. (2003) , Krishnan (2003) , DeAngelo (1981) , Dye (1993) and Craswell et al. (1995) provide strong support that large audit firms provide higher quality audits compared to small firms. Kim et al. (2003) and Krishnan (2003) argue that large audit firms have stronger incentives to protect their reputations because they lose clients if they produce low quality audits. Researchers, policy makers and practitioners have debated the joint provision of audit and non-audit services because it can have conflicting impacts on the quality of audit.
2.4
Performance measures This research uses both accounting and accounting-market (hybrid) performance measures to examine the effect of monitoring mechanisms on company performance. It is expected that the different monitoring mechanisms will influence management to work for the company's best interests and this will eventually induce them to report in the interests of the stakeholders. Most performance measurement models such as return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and earnings per share (EPS) are widely regarded by the users as most useful and the ultimate bottom line of business performance. Although accounting information is useful and important in corporate governance studies, all agency costs are not reflected in the accounting measures (Wiwattanakantang, 2001) . Bacidore et al. (1997) argued for using hybrid based performance measurement -i.e. the price-earnings ratio (PER), market-to-book value (MBV) and dividend yield (DY) -to measure shareholders' wealth creation.
Propositions and methodology
The various indicators or proxy elements associated with the (i) board and its committees, (ii) shareholders, and (iii) independent auditors in the monitoring process and their relationship to company performance are presented as an empirical schema. The research questions for testing in this study are:
Do the various monitoring mechanisms associated with the three categories of players have a substitution effect?
(ii) Do the various monitoring mechanisms associated with the three categories of players have a complementary effect?
For testing propositions (ii) and (ii) we use SEM because it can deal with multicollinearity and it reveals potential complex interrelationships among monitoring mechanisms. By using SEM it is possible to model important latent variables while taking into account any unreliability of indicators (Wooldridge, 2003) . Most of the corporate governance variables are latent, which means they are otherwise difficult to measure. Again, in all multivariate analyses it is assumed that there is no error in the variables. However, it is well known from practical and theoretical perspectives that it is impossible to perfectly measure a latent concept without considering error. SEM improves the statistical estimate by considering this type of error. SEM examines a series of dependent relationships simultaneously -which is particularly useful when one dependent variable becomes an independent variable in subsequent dependent relationships -this helps to avoid the problem of multicolleniarity.
There is no single statistical test that describes the goodness-of-fit of the model. Instead, researchers have developed a number of goodness-of-fit measures which assess the results. For this type of study it is necessary to have sufficient data to facilitate the observation of important differences or relationships. SEM applications typically use 200-500 cases to fit models that have from 10-18 observed variables. This research uses Australian Top 500 companies for the period 2004 -2006 and 17 observed variables (monitoring mechanisms).
Block shareholders, because of their greater bargaining power over the firm relative to individuals, are more likely to influence management. Block shareholders exercise a 'voice' through direct negotiation with management and proxy contests (Chowdhury, 2004) . In so doing, block shareholders determine the distribution of power between managers and shareholders. Ownership concentration can function as a monitor that can reduce the scope of managerial opportunism or shirking (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986) . Ownership concentration is measured by (1) the percentage of shares held by the top shareholders, (2) the percentage of shares held by the next top 19 shareholders and (2) shareholding by the executive and nonexecutive directors. Both are used to measure the monitoring ability of the block shareholders of the company.
Board size is measured as the number of directors on the board and board diligence is measured as the number of board meetings per year. Board independence is measured as the proportion of independent directors to total directors. Financial expertise signifies past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities (according to Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999).
To represent the degree of separation between the roles of board chair and corporate CEO, the analysis employed a dummy variable, taking a value of 0 if the roles of the chair and CEO are exercised by the same individual and 1 if the role is exercised by different individuals.
Indicators of audit committee effectiveness are independence and expertise of committee members. Independence is the proportion of committee members who are described as independent. Similarly to the board, the financial expertise of audit committee members is measured as the proportion of members with financial literacy or having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities. Since another recommendation is to have regular meetings, the number of audit committee meetings is also measured.
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Effectiveness and independence of the nomination and remuneration committee are measured by the number of directors assigned to those committees and independence is determined by the proportion of committee members that are described as independent.
Auditors do not directly monitor management; however, they provide an assurance service that improves the quality of financial information. External audits are used to increase the reliability of financial statements (Chow, 1982) . The extent to which financial statements can reduce agency costs is dependent on the quality of the audit, thus the quality of audit acts as a control mechanism. For measuring the quality of audit, this study classifies audit firms into large and small. Large firms comprise the Big Four. Here, a value of 1 is assigned when the company uses a large audit firm and 0 for otherwise. Another factor that can influence the monitoring of the auditor is the joint provision of audit and non-audit services. This research therefore quantifies the amount of non-audit fees as a ratio of total audit fees to determine the level of independence.
Data and company characteristics
The initial sample for this study consists of 1500 company-year observations from another Australian comprehensive source of data for listed companies, is used to collect data on company performance measures. This information is cross-checked with the annual reports obtained from Aspect and Connect 4. The ASX website was used to rank the companies according to market capitalisation, obtain industry classifications for each company and know whether the company is listed, de-listed or has changed its name.
Performance data for these companies were collected for the years 2004 -2008 (and for 2010 for robustness test), so that one and two year lagged analysis is possible. We have calculated industry average performance data which help to avoid bias in the performance data. A probable concern when dealing with current-year performance is that it is difficult to understand the cause-effect relationship -which leads to the endogeneity issue. This problem can be avoided when SEM is employed (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2006) .
With reference to industry classification (based on 4 digits GICS code), most company-years in the sample operate in the financial sector (21.63%), followed by the materials sector (18.93%). The remaining 60% are involved in energy, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, information technology, telecommunication and utilities.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
On average the top 20 shareholders held 63% of shares. In our sample, in 1,059 companyyears (75%) the top 20 shareholders held more than 50% of the issued shares and in 431 company-years 31% held more than 75% of the issued shares. On average, the directors of the board held 16% of issued shares.
In the study the average board size was 6 directors (maximum=17, minimum=3). Most (n=1,246, 88%) had a board size of 4 to 9 directors, Average number of board meetings was 10 per annum (maximum=37 2 , minimum=2). More than 82% company-years (1,158) had a board with a majority of independent members. Eighty percent (1,143) had 1 to 4 independent directors on the board. In 56 (4%) company-years there were no financially literate members on the board and in 229 (16%) all directors were financially literate. In the sample, there were 168 (12%) where the roles of chair and CEO were occupied by one person. One hundred and fifty-three (7%) did not convene any audit committee meetings, and 66% (929) held 2 to 4 audit committee meetings per annum. In the sample, 79% (1,117 company-years) held between 1 to 3 meetings per annum. Only 288 (20%) company-years had a nomination committee. Of these, 239 companies convened 1 to 4 nomination committee meetings per annum. Only in six committees were there no independent directors.
From the sample, 1,158 company-years (82%) were audited by a Big 4 auditor. It is expected that the auditing by a 'Big 4' auditor will improve the audit quality. The average non-audit fees earned by the external auditor are $AU8369. In the sample of companies studied, 36% (508) earned higher non-audit fees compared to audit fees.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The Spearman Correlation Matrix (Table 3) shows that there are few pairs of independent variables with a high correlation (i.e. more than 0.6). For example, there is a correlation of 0.6886 between the top 19 shareholders and top one shareholder; correlation of 0.6164 between the proportion of financially literate directors on the audit committee and the proportion of board financially literate directors; and correlation of 0.6218 between the proportion of independent directors on the nomination committee and nomination committee meetings. However, as this research uses SEM, it can competently manage the multicollinearity issue.
Analysis of the results
Initially models were run to test the effect of monitoring variables on the performance of the full dataset (1410 company-years). The models were run for each year separately, which assisted in comparing the changes, if any. As a test of robustness, the model was then run to test whether there was any variation in the result when considering one, two and three years lagged performance for these companies throughout the sample period. The same dataset was run using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method and compared the results with SEM. We have also collected data for the year 2010 to observe the effect after the global financial crisis.
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Fitness of the structural models
The overall goodness-of-fit for structural equation models depends on many factors. No single magic value for the fit indices separates good from poor models, and it is not practical to apply a single set of cutoff rules to all measurement models and for that matter to all SEM models of any type (Hair et al., 2006) . The application of multiple fit measures will enable a consensus across types of measures regarding acceptability of the proposed model to be attained. Various goodness-of-fit measures assess the results from three perspectives: (i) absolute fit measure; (ii) incremental fit measures; and (iii) parsimonious fit measure.
Absolute fit measures: Absolute fit measures are used to understand the degree to which the overall model (structural and measurement models) predicts the observed covariance or correlation matrix. For this reason this study uses two commonly used absolute fit measures: chi-square statistic (χ2) and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Incremental fit measure: Incremental fit assesses how well a specified model fits relative to some alternative baseline model. To measure incremental fit, the following indices are used: adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI), comparative fit index (CFI) and normal fit index (NFI). AGFI indices from 0.902 to 0.963. For all models a recommended acceptable level is a value greater than or equal to 0.90 (Hu and Bentler, 1999) . The CFI has been found to be more appropriate in a model's development. This research found the CFI value ranges from 0.942 to 0.963. This is consistent with the findings of Hair et al. (2006), who discovered that value falls between 0 to 1 with higher values indicating superior goodness-of-fit. NFI, which is a relative comparison of the proposed model to the null model, indicates results ranging from 0.0897 to 0.937. Hair et al. (2006) showed that NFI ranges between 0 and 1 with a cut-off value of 0.90, where 0 indicates no fit and 1 indicate perfect fit. Considering this standard, these results indicate that the models are near to perfect fit.
Parsimonious fit measures: Parsimonious fit provides information about which model is best. Conceptually, parsimonious fit indices are similar to the notion of an adjusted R 2 in the sense that they relate to model fitness (Hu and Bentler, 1999) . One of the measures of parsimonious fit is normed chi-square (χ2 /d.f.). The value of normed chi-square (χ2 /d.f.) ranges from 11 | P a g e 1.888 to 2.395. As suggested by Carmines and McIver (1981) , normed chi-square ranges from 2 to 1 or 3 to 1 indicating an acceptable fit between the hypothetical model and sample data.
5.2
Substitute or complementary effect of monitoring There are three groups of monitoring variables in the model: shareholders, board of directors and external auditors. For all models, the relationships are significant among shareholders, external auditors and board monitoring variables for all the identified paths. The research question is whether in the Australian context, a substitution or complementary effect exists among the monitoring variables. Prior studies point to the existence of such effects, although country-specific institutional factors (such as regulations, labour force market, stakeholders' expectations) that shape monitoring variables and their effectiveness make the generalizability of findings from these prior studies questionable.
Various monitoring mechanisms have strong links and it is important to consider these linkages between corporate governance variables and how their relationships are structured. It is expected that in practice, various monitoring mechanisms are set up to operate jointly in order to resolve the shareholder-manager agency problem. For example, if it is accepted that the board of directors, through the audit committee, monitors the role of external auditors, this means the board influences the quality of the auditor function. Similarly, shareholder concentration appears to influence auditors with respect to their impact on performance. When there are concentrated shareholders, they will keep pressure on auditors by acting as a proper monitor of reported performance.
Shareholder and board of directors monitoring:

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Of all the accounting and hybrid measurement models, Table 5 Table 6 . The auditor's function is confirmed as a value-adding activity for the board monitoring process. An important role of the board of directors is to oversee the financial information provided in the annual report. To do this the board engages auditors to assure the quality of the published financial reports prepared by management. Hence, a higher quality auditor complements a more independent and active board.
The findings of this study are consistent with that of Beasley and Petroni (2001) , who noted that independent boards are more likely to hire a high quality, industry specialist audit firm for quality monitoring. Until recently, boards of directors tended to select audit firms. This role has increasingly been taken over by an audit committee that is part of the board (Gay and Simnett, 2006) . Therefore, both board and auditor monitoring is essential in the monitoring process and they cannot substitute for each other.
Shareholders and auditor monitoring:
The external auditing function is mandatory for all listed companies. Therefore, it is supplied for the advantage of all shareholders. However, the question is the quality of auditor monitoring of reported corporate financial information and to what extent the shareholders depend on the auditor's role. If the shareholders have sufficient privilege or influence in accessing the monitoring and control functions of the company's management they can become less dependent on the auditor's monitoring. This influence is shown in Table 7 where a significantly inverse relationship between shareholder monitoring and auditor monitoring is demonstrated.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
This result indicates that shareholder monitoring can be a substitute for auditor monitoring. Shareholder monitoring is measured by insider shareholder/managers and block shareholders ownership. If shareholdings by managers and block shareholders are high, they tend to become less dependent on auditor monitoring. Therefore, shareholder monitoring can be a substitute for auditor monitoring.
It is likely the complementary/substitution effects within one company will vary little over time. Yet in Table 5 Tables 6 and 7 . This coefficient explains that the substitution effect between shareholders and board monitoring was lower. The explanation for this may lie in the CLERP 9 amendments to the Corporations Act which took effect on 1 July 2004 (reflected in financial reports published in 2005) and introduced substantial changes to the Australian corporate reporting and disclosure landscape. In 2005, instead of depending on shareholder or board monitoring the focus shifted towards reporting and disclosure.
Robustness tests
This research finds a similar substitute and complementary relationship among corporate monitoring mechanisms when examining the relationship between board, shareholders and auditors monitoring on one, two and three year lagged performance. All the models indicate that there is a substitution effect existing between shareholders monitoring with board monitoring and auditors monitoring, and a complementary relationship between board and auditor monitoring. Substitution and complementary relationships among monitoring mechanisms may explain why previous studies failed to find the models having consistent results when examining the effect of monitoring on company performance.
[ Again, despite the use of multiple performance measures, this paper loads them onto (i) one single performance measures and (ii) two separate (accounting and market) measures. The results are consistent with multiple performance measures.
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
Again, a robustness test was done using data It seems that the governing boards of listed companies seemed unable to prevent the risky and ill-fated decisions that jeopardized their companies, devastated their investors, and helped precipitate a financial meltdown that morphed into a global recession. This furthermore had a negative impact on investors' trust in board monitoring. Similarly, after the GFC, shareholders became more careful about their financial interment and auditors were aware of the GFC and become more conservative in their requirements.
6.
Conclusion This study developed and tested a conceptual model to better understand the complex relationships between various monitoring mechanisms and their impact on company performance by using SEM. As evidence from the paper SEM is superior in identifying the cause-effect relationships among variables and the existence of reverse causality. Very few studies have employed SEM to examine the inter-relationships among the corporate governance variables in Australia. The prospect of changes to monitoring mechanisms in response to performance deficiencies gives rise to simultaneity issues. Effective combinations of corporate governance mechanisms would mean that a company can perform better and satisfy its shareholders' interests.
Results show a greater consistency across all the models when examining the substitution or complementary effects between the combinations of: (a) shareholders and board of directors monitoring, (b) board of directors and auditor monitoring, and (c) shareholders and auditors monitoring. A single monitoring mechanism will be compensated to some extent by an alternative one. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of Ward et al. (2009 ), Boo and Sharma (2008 ), Fernández and Arrondo (2005 , and Coles et al. (2001) . Specifically, if governance mechanisms can complement or substitute for each other, then no clear 14 | P a g e relationship could be established between monitoring mechanisms (when considered independently of each other) and company performance. This fact can explain why previous research has found inconsistent results. By confirming these relationships, this study adds value to the body of literature on monitoring and its influence on company performance.
Both the literature review and empirical findings of this research point to the practical reality of diversity in corporate governance structures, activities and practices across countries and corporations. Differences in business circumstances, competitive conditions in Australia's capital market compared to those of the USA and UK, and differences in Australian corporate board structure compared to Japan and Germany, give rise to the importance of developing a modified corporate governance system. It needs to be a system that best suits the operations of corporations in their local, national or regional context.
A number of limitations influence the results of this study, and these need to be addressed in order to improve the integrity of future research in this area. Firstly, this study did not classify block shareholders into different categories (e.g. institutional shareholders, government ownership, family ownership, corporate ownership). This issue is important in accommodating the varying motivations of block shareholders who want to retain control over the companies in which they have invested. Secondly, three accounting bases and three hybrid measurements were used in this study. This strategy may impede some important performance features that could be obtained through other tools such as stock market return. Therefore, this study may not accurately report companies' intrinsic business performance. Accounting measures of performance are subject to accounting policy choice, while hybrid measures of performance are affected by market inefficiencies. Third, this research tests the attendance of directors at company meetings as a form of monitoring. However, it does not consider the degree of their involvement, and whether their business experience may have an impact on the quality of monitoring. Fourthly, the notion that monitoring effectiveness can be observed in performance is largely a long-term view and short-term effects are likely to be weak. However, changes in mechanisms and conditions preclude testing lag effects for arbitrarily long periods. Fifthly and finally, this research only uses information concerning the top 500 companies. Other listed companies may have very different monitoring mechanisms and these may exhibit different kinds of impacts on how well they perform. For this reason the results may have been different if the remainder of the listed companies or the bottom 500 listed companies were sampled.
For future research, the model in this study could be expanded to include more alternative monitoring mechanisms that influence a company's performance. For example, equity-based incentives such as granting of rights, bonus shares and share options to managers are widely used to align the interests of the principals (owners) and the agent (employees). Similarly, there are different control mechanisms such as those derived from the market where managerial talent has the expertise and integrity to reduce agency-related problems. Performance-based cash bonuses represent another mechanism for encouraging the agent to work so that the company's performance targets are achieved. Furthermore, the interlocking of directors and auditors can influence monitoring procedures and effectiveness. While this study did not consider what the impact of this would have on company performance, the way is open such to a theme being pursued in future research. Here, 
